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ABSTRACT 
 During the early and intermediate phases of a nuclear or radiological incident, 
the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) collects 
environmental samples that are analyzed by organizations with radioanalytical 
capability.  Resources dedicated to quality assurance (QA) activities must be 
sufficient to assure that appropriate radioanalytical measurement quality 
objectives (MQOs) and assessment data quality objectives (DQOs) are met.  As 
the emergency stabilizes, QA activities will evolve commensurate with the need 
to reach appropriate DQOs.  The MQOs represent a compromise between 
precise analytical determinations and the timeliness necessary for emergency 
response activities.  Minimum detectable concentration (MDC), lower limit of 
detection, and critical level tests can all serve as measurements reflecting the 
MQOs.  The relationship among protective action guides (PAGs), derived 
response levels (DRLs), and laboratory detection limits is described.  The 
rationale used to determine the appropriate laboratory detection limit is 
described. 
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Introduction 
The initial federal response for a nuclear/radiological incident is from the 
U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) regionally-based Radiological Assistance 
Program (RAP), Emergency Management Teams, and Nuclear Incident 
Response Team Assets.  These teams communicate incident information to the 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory National Atmospheric Release Advisory 
Center (NARAC) and the Sandia National Laboratories High Consequence 
Assessment and Technology Department.  These organizations have tools that 
are used to characterize the airborne source material and simulate atmospheric 
dispersion and surface deposition.  Deposition and dispersion models are 
needed to predict dose to humans from airborne or ground contamination 
through several pathways (air immersion exposure, ground exposure, inhalation, 
and ingestion).  Modeling results are typically plotted as maps of areas 
corresponding to a range of air or ground contamination levels that might be 
encountered by field monitoring teams, and for areas where the predicted 
(modeled) dose exceeds PAGs. 
As appropriate, the DOE’s Aerial Measuring System (AMS), which is an 
aerial radiological surveillance capability, is deployed.  The AMS uses two 
platforms:  a fixed-wing aircraft for rapid response to measure areas of relatively 
high concentrations of higher energy gamma-emitting radionuclides, and a 
helicopter for higher spatial resolution of lower concentrations with the capability 
of detecting lower-energy gamma emitters.  The AMS fixed-wing aircraft 
objective is to provide decision makers with an overview of the radiological 
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impact as quickly as possible.  The data from the AMS aircraft are usually the 
first comprehensive set of measurements and are used by the modelers to 
normalize and refine their predictions and by decision makers for response 
actions.  The AMS data may cover the area from several kilometers upwind of 
the release location to the farthest downwind extent of the deposition.  The width 
of the area flown will depend on the modeled deposition pattern. 
Modeling can help identify the most likely areas of concern for the 
responders.  However, it is vitally important that aerial surveys and ground-truth 
measurements be taken as soon as practical after the event to allow the 
refinement of such models and to start the development of data maps that truly 
identify the hazards and issues as they are in the field.  The primary goal is to 
replace the early model-based predictions, used to project initial protective 
actions, with actual monitoring results. 
Initial monitoring activities will focus on protecting the public and 
responders.  One of the first sampling priorities is establishing a defendable 
resuspension factor.  This will require collecting air particulate samples; 
conducting alpha, beta, and gamma radiation surveys; and performing an in situ 
gamma spectrum collection and analysis.  A soil sample is also collected at this 
site for later analysis to further quantify resuspension levels.  Field teams are 
also equipped with tools for a variety of sampling activities to allow them to 
collect multiple environmental samples such as soil, water, milk, vegetation, 
foliage, etc., for definitive radioanalyses to confirm the initial field measurements.   
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Instrument surveys are conducted when a sample is collected.  These surveys 
will help determine the presence or absence of a plume and field radiation levels. 
During the early phase, there is little capacity for analytical radiochemistry 
and decisions will be made based on predictive dispersion models supplemented 
with field radiation measurements.  The analytical response during this phase will 
be limited to field instrumentation, mobile laboratories, and local analytical 
capability.  A database of radioanalytical organizations’ capability, capacity, and 
competence indicators (Radioanalytical Organization Database for Emergency 
Operations – [RODEO]) is available to the FRMAC laboratory supervisor.  During 
the initial phase of the incident, the quantity of analytical data needed for 
assessment quickly increases.  The DQOs are adjusted to be commensurate 
with the urgency of the decision at hand and the risk of potential consequences 
from an incorrect decision. 
Assessment commences as soon as information begins to arrive.  The 
focus is on performing assessments that will provide guidance for decision 
makers regarding what areas may warrant evacuation and/or whether citizens 
can be sheltered-in-place to avoid doses greater than the PAGs.  Initial 
predictions and projections will be made using available knowledge and 
experience to determine early bounding assumptions.  The initial NARAC model 
will provide a prediction of what areas are most affected and where to begin 
sheltering, evacuation, and initial data-gathering efforts. 
As more field data becomes available, including the AMS flyover data, the 
amount of radioactive material released can reasonably be estimated.  The 
Page 5 of 17 
modeled plume is then fitted to field measurements to provide the first 
reasonable view of the overall extent of the impacted areas so that accurate 
assessments of the expected radiation dose can be made.  This information is 
plotted on a map showing areas where the potential dose may exceed the PAG 
without implementation of protective actions.  As more data becomes available, 
the plume model inputs are further refined to adjust the plume model to properly 
match the results being observed in the field. 
The next important action for the assessment scientist is to determine the 
relative concentrations and identification of the radionuclides released.  This 
source term information is very important because it has significant impact on the 
dose assessment calculations.  Different methods can be used to obtain this 
information depending upon the type of release.  For a nuclear weapon accident, 
nuclear detonation, or nuclear reactor release, the expected radionuclide mixture 
can reasonably be determined from process knowledge based on the material 
released.  However, for a radiological dispersal device (RDD), it is much more 
difficult to determine the radionuclides involved and their relative abundance.  If 
there is any intelligence information related to the release, that information can 
also be used.  However, until appropriate laboratory analysis is performed, the 
assessment scientists cannot be sure of the identity of all of the radionuclides 
involved in an RDD event. 
Early in the event, all information available, as well as the experience of 
personnel, will be used to make initial predictions.  As more data becomes 
available, this prediction will be advanced, allowing refinement of plume 
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predictions, which ultimately bounds the predicted areas where PAGs may be 
exceeded.  During this phase, geographical information system (GIS) maps can 
be created and reproduced every few hours.  Changes to the plume model can 
occur with each iteration as better and more precise measurement information 
becomes available. 
As initial samples are submitted to radioanalytical laboratories, the 
nuclides of interest and MQOs must be communicated to laboratory personnel. 
 
DQOs for Assessment 
In addition to the response structure, the federal government, through the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), has established PAGs for the public and the environment.  
These PAGs were published in the EPA Manual of Protective Action Guides and 
Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents (EPA, 1992).  This document divides the 
response to a nuclear incident into three phases, each with its own set of PAGs.  
These are termed the early, intermediate, and late phases.  These phases 
cannot be represented by specific time periods since events vary greatly in 
magnitude and phases may overlap due to the transition of activities.  These 
guidelines are used by the FRMAC in developing data products and by the 
Advisory Team in providing protective action recommendations to state and local 
decision makers (Table 1).  It is important to note that any support provided by 
the federal government in these areas is at the request of state and local 
authorities. 
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A derived response level (DRL) is the quantity of a surrogate or 
radionuclide at which a particular PAG will be exceeded under selected 
assumptions.  Numerous DRLs are required, each corresponding to a particular 
surrogate/nuclide, PAG, and set of assumptions.  DRLs may require revision to 
reflect radioactive decay or modification of assumptions.  DRLs are subject to a 
“sum of the fractions” rule.  This is where the dose calculated from each 
radionuclide measured or modeled is summed such that the total dose from all 
the radionuclides is calculated and compared to the PAG.  Since each 
radionuclide has a different dose conversion factor for each pathway, the most 
prevalent radionuclide may not be the one that is causing the largest fraction of 
the projected dose. 
The FDA recommended a limited set of standards for the presence of 
radioactivity in human food (FDA, 1998).  These recommendations are known as 
the derived intervention level (DIL) for specific radionuclides and groups of 
radionuclides (Table 2).  A DIL corresponds to the radioactive concentration in 
food present during the relevant period of time that, in the absence of any 
intervention, could lead to an individual receiving a radiation dose equal to the 
PAG.  The FDA DILs provide a large margin of safety for the public because 
each is based on the most vulnerable portion of the population.  In addition, 
protective actions would be taken if the radionuclide concentrations were to 
reach the DIL at any point in time, though these concentrations would need to be 
sustained throughout the extended time period for the dose to actually reach the 
PAG.  DILs are based on the total food in the diet and assume that contaminated 
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food could comprise 30% of the total diet.  This was based on the expectation 
that contaminated food would not exceed 10% of the total diet and included a 
three-fold safety factor to account for limited sub-populations that might be more 
dependent on local food supplies. 
Because of differences in assumptions (more conservative), the FDA DILs 
do not utilize the “sum of the fractions” rule as PAGs do.  Instead, each DIL is like 
a “stand-alone” DRL and can be independently used for detection limit 
determination. 
The EPA is currently considering a new PAG for drinking water.  This new 
PAG would limit the dose from consumption of one liter of water per day to 500 
mrem during the first year.  It is anticipated that current drinking water standards 
(4 mrem/year) will apply after the first year.  It is not clear whether this dose 
standard is in addition to the existing PAG or a pathway standard within the 
current PAG.  This guidance could be published in 2006.  Current PAGs are 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
Derivation of Laboratory Measurement Quality Objectives 
Assessment DAQs (derived from PAGs and DILs) drive the needs for 
analytical MQOs.  When the source term of the release is known or can be 
estimated with a quantifiable level of confidence, analytical MQOs are a rather 
straightforward calculation.  Marker radionuclides (that can be easily quantified 
with field instruments) are identified and the dose contributions of additional 
radionuclides are scaled to calculate a total dose.  Detection limit requirements 
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for each radionuclide can then be communicated to laboratories supporting the 
response effort. 
An example of this situation would be a scenario involving a nuclear power 
plant or a spent fuel incident.  In cases like this where the source term is well 
defined and the material is homogenous, scaling radionuclides will reduce much 
of the immediate need for radioanalytical information.  Proportional DRLs can be 
calculated for each radionuclide and these, in turn, are used as the basis for 
determining laboratory detection limit requirements. 
In other scenarios, where the source term is unknown, there is a great 
deal of uncertainty in trying to determine appropriate radionuclides to analyze.  
Additionally, the method to determine the appropriate detection limits needed to 
identify areas where PAGs may be exceeded is unknown.  Using situational 
awareness, experience, and best-guess estimates to determine which 
radionuclides to analyze for and recommending detection limits to laboratories, is 
not a reproducible process among individuals, and could result in significant 
uncertainties in determining the areas where PAGs may be exceeded.  
Documenting a process to use in these cases will enable the estimation of 
uncertainty and bias of these cases. 
 
MQO Process 
DRLs are published in Volume II of the FRMAC Assessment Manual 
(DOE, 2003b).  They are calculated for a variety of exposure scenarios using the 
dose conversion factors from Federal Guidance Report No. 11 (EPA, 1988).  
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When radionuclides are sorted in ascending order of their DRL, the radionuclide 
with the highest dose conversion factor is at the top of the table.  The top entry is 
the radionuclide that, if present, will produce the highest dose for a given 
concentration in the pathway or model selected.  An example for early phase 
deposition is found in Table 3.  In this case, the pathway and model incorporates 
the direct dose from groundshine, and the inhalation doses from resuspension.  
Other models and assumptions will produce different values, but are primarily 
driven by the dose-conversion factor utilized.  Only the isotopes with the highest 
dose-conversion factors (and, thus, low DRLs) are listed in this table.  Virtually all 
other radionuclides will be of less concern from a detection limit criteria. 
 
Sum of the Fractions Rule 
 Because PAGs are a total projected dose and DRLs are calculated on the 
basis of a single radionuclide producing a dose equal to the PAG, if there are 
multiple radionuclides present, a calculation must be applied to modify each DRL 
to a level where the dose from the mixture will not exceed the PAG.  This 
calculation is commonly referred to as the “sum of the fractions rule” or the “unity 
rule.” 
 Mathematically, this can be described as the sum of the activity 
concentration for each measured radionuclide divided by its DRL.  Table 3 
indicates the DRL for Pu-239 is 34 uCi/m2.  A soil sample collected by the 
FRMAC soil sample template is approximately 360 grams (based on a collection 
area of 10 cm x 10 cm (100 cm2 x 2 cm [deep] x 1.8 g/cc) that will typically 
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produce a nominal laboratory value of 944 pCi/g.  If the actual Pu-239 
concentration reported by the laboratory was 100 pCi/g, the Pu-239 would “use 
up” approximately 11% of the PAG.  If Am-241 were the other radionuclide 
present, a concentration greater than 89% of the table value (816pCi/g) would 
produce a total greater than 100% of the PAG. 
 This same calculation must be applied to detection limit requirements 
communicated to analytical laboratories.  The possibility of a high dose 
conversion factor radionuclide “hiding” in a mixture must be considered when 
determining MQOs for each sample. 
 Consider modifying the previous example to include Cs-137.  The DRL for 
Cs-137 converts to a nominal soil sample concentration of 55,600 pCi/g.  If there 
were Cs-137 present at approximately 50% of this DRL (27,600 pCi/g), this 
would then force the detection limit for the Am-241 down to 50% of the soil 
concentration listed or 417 pCi/g.  The situation could be complicated further by 
the presence of Pu-239 at even a smaller fraction of its limit (10%).  Thus, 
94 Ci/g of Pu-239 added to this mixture would indicate that occupation of this 
area beyond 4 days (100 hours) would exceed the PAG. 
 
Current and Future Work 
 With an obviously unknowable situation during an emergency, it is difficult 
to determine what to tell laboratories to look for and to what detection limits.  
FRMAC is developing an automated tool that will assist the assessment scientist 
and laboratory analysis supervisor in answering these questions. 
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 At its heart, the procedure iteratively calculates a DRL for each 
radionuclide based on each piece of information as it becomes available.  As 
in situ gamma spectroscopy results become available, they are fed into the 
algorithm and the DRLs for all of the other radionuclides are recalculated.  As 
additional information is added, the table is reshuffled to order the radionuclides 
in ascending order of their DRL.  This process has been demonstrated on a small 
scale with Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. 
 There are limitations and uncertainties inherent to this methodology that 
have yet to be fully quantified.  Inhomogeneity in deposition of the radionuclide 
mixture is a large source of uncertainty.  This inhomogeneity could be caused by 
the chemical and physical forms of the dispersed material as well as spatial and 
temporal variations of the dispersal combined with micrometeorology.  Full 
implementation of this solution will not prevent analytical errors from being made 
during an emergency, but will prevent an error from becoming a catastrophe. 
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Table 1. Protective Action Guidelines (EPA) 
Protective Action Guidelines (EPA) 
Timeframe 
Projected 
Dose Notes 
1-4 Days 1-5 rem  Evacuation or sheltering 
1st Year  2 rem Relocation 
2nd Year and any 
single year after first 
500 mrem Relocation 
50 year total 5 rem Includes any dose received 
during first and second year 
1st Year  500 mrem Drinking water (*Proposed) 
Ingestion PAG (FDA) 
Timeframe 
Projected 
Dose Notes 
1 year 500 mrem Commited dose to age 70 
1 year 5 rem Dose to individual tissue or 
organ 
 
Table 2.  Derived Intervention Levels 
FDA DIL 
Radionuclide Group pCi/kg 
238Pu + 239Pu + 241Am 5.40E+01 
90Sr 4.30E+03 
131I 4.60E+03 
134Cs + 137Cs 3.20E+04 
103Ru + 106Ru (103Ru/180,000) + 
(106Ru/12,000)<1 
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Table 3. Early Phase Derived Response Levels 
Radionuclide 
Early Phase 
Deposition & 
Resuspension 
Inhalation (uCi/m²) 
Nominal 
pCi/g soil Radionuclide 
Early Phase 
Deposition & 
Resuspension 
Inhalation (uCi/m²) 
Nominal 
pCi/g soil 
227Ac 2.20E+00 6.11E+01 230Th 4.50E+01 1.25E+03 
232Th 8.90E+00 2.47E+02 243Cm 4.70E+01 1.31E+03 
231Pa 1.10E+01 3.06E+02 244Cm 5.90E+01 1.64E+03 
232U 2.20E+01 6.11E+02 252Cf 9.30E+01 2.58E+03 
237Np 2.70E+01 7.50E+02 236Pu 1.00E+02 2.78E+03 
245Cm 3.20E+01 8.89E+02 
233U, 234U, U 
Enrich 1.10E+02 3.06E+03 
241Am, 243Am 3.30E+01 9.17E+02 
235U, 236U, 238U, U 
Dep, U Nat 1.20E+02 3.33E+03 
239Pu, 240Pu, 
242mAm 3.40E+01 9.44E+02 
147Sm 2.00E+02 5.56E+03 
242Pu 3.60E+01 1.00E+03 
238Pu 3.70E+01 1.03E+03 
228Th 4.30E+01 1.19E+03 
The Early Phase deposition DRL expresses the Early 
Phase PAG in terms of the level of deposition on the 
ground that corresponds to a projected dose equal to 
the PAG. 
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